TIs NOW a yoar since the rovchutianary gua illas of the Farabundo Marti National Libera tion Front (FMLN) launched their final offensive against the US-backed right wing dictatorship. the regime, FMLN now control a quarter of the country.
States poured in weapons and other forms of aid to the dictatorship.
United States thought that it would be possible to crush the guerrillas. offensive failed; as the above map shows the FMLN now controls many important strategic regime is able to secure the towns. But in the countryside important liberated zones exists, including some within twenty miles capital.
In 1981 El Salvdor received more US military aid than any other Latin American Coullll y military 'advisors' now comprise something like per Cell the Salvadorian army's officer corps. The US military aid has included radio trucks, M-16 rifles and ammunitition, planes and forty helicopters.
The role of the US advisors has been to supervise ine overal operallon of the war, and especially to ensure the correct use of helicopter tactics. They have also supervised the formation a fleet coastal patrol boats to try to cut off supplies of arms to the guerrillas, and the formation and training of the elite Atlacati brigade — El Slavador's very own 'green berets'.
Despite the flow weapons to the regime's army and national guard, and the increase in size of the the military Rally. forces of the regime have suffered high Although the offensive failed to topple after a year's hard struggle the In the period after the offensive, the United The regime and the But their counterareas of the country. Just as in Vietnam, the casualty and desertion In six months last Tale. year, ten per cent of the arKilled or wounded.
The tactics of the Salvadorian army have taken on an increasingly 'Vietnam' style, helicopter-borne troops hying into lne countrysiac on 'search and destroy' MISSIONs. The obiective of these missions is to fly into FMLN-held territory, destroy training camps dua other guerrilla 311stallations and attack villages which support the Just as in Vietnam, a crucial objective of these attacks is to terrorise the Clain population. Sometimes these raids do an tact madaze to discover and destroy FMLN camps, But just as in Vietnam, the coverlilicill tually fly out: the guerrillas and villagers LIC No permanent calls alc wull.
The January 1981 offensive failed because, itself recognises, there was insufficient political preparation and military intervention in the towns. i ne population, without adequate protection, failed to carry through the insurrectionary general In the period following that setback. the FMLN returned to the offensive through their sauulare campaign, which has disrupted electricity supDues and drastically curtailed production. Industrial production, largeas a result of the campaign and the war climate, has decreased by twenty five per cent over three years.
In addition, the FMLN has concentrated on conducting. local offensives and widening, the rural areas control. The extension of these areas has facilitated the FMLN guerrillas between them - a system of routes for transferring guerrilla forces and supdlies. • This enables them to quickly switch their forces from one front to another.
The military situation which has therefore emerged from year since the offensive is one Te auve stalentale Neither side able to defeat the other - otten a classic phase of a guerrilla war. Nonetheless there is a situation of genuine dual power. The FMLN guerrillas now permanently administer a section of the country. The trend of development is towards a strengthening of the power of the guerrillas, the country ungovernable and economy continues to decav. As the guerrillas get stronger, and the regime talls the possibility of intervention by the United States increases.