aders considered the option of usle me mouse or cords to so disrup: le British Army that it would leave te Ulster Volunteers unchallenged in cland.
Strategy aw, arching in Belfast in 1974.
FOLKS!!
GAME INGTONS !!! The plan, as developed by Bonar Carson and leading establish CALLED "THE COLLAPSE OF BRITISH the Edward Carson figures Cenal expert Professor Dicey, was Lord Halsbury and constitufor the Tory-dominated House of Lords to either vote against or amend Bill, by which voted the necessary money to pay the wages of the Army.
HOW CAN YOU CALL IT A GAME WHEN THE ODDS ARE". HEy!!
HOW DOES THIS GAME END 2 Two ploys were suggested by the Tory and Unionist leaders. One wa to vote against the Bill, the other was to amend it so as to exclude the Arm DCIS used in Ulster.
neither tactic was put into operation mainly because a number of Tories very existence of the Army was too mccaine wit Ene I THE GAME END WHEN THE CAPITALIST STRANGLE THE GUTS LAST PRI MONDAY's 'Day of Action' was the third attempt at strike action undertaken by the Loyalists in seven years. On the two previous the authorities in cluding the Army, showed lit tle willingness to take on the Loyalists.
The first strike was in May 1974. It had two aims. One was to bring down the "power-sharing" government or the North of Ireland, led by Unionist Brian Faulkner and Gerry Fitt of the Social Democratic and Labour Party The other aim was to prevent the establishment of a Council of Ireland a move which had been agreed by the Unionists, the SDLP and the British and Irish governments as part of the December 1973 "Sunningdale' •HETECHECHE The strike was called by the Ulste Workers Council. It was backed by a number of Loyalist politicians, including Paisley.
The strikers were taking on the Labour government Harold Wilson, and Northern Secretary, Merlyn Rees. Wilson went dangerous on television to denounce the strikers this way, the Tories and their WILL UNE ATI as 'spongers', but this verbal assault in this way, the was the most vigorous opposition offriends in the military establishment fered by the government to the decided on approach: to strikers spread military disaffection, even The Ulster Defence Association mutiny by Army officers. Prominent openly controlled the streets of in this conspiracy were Bonar General Wilson, operations in the war office, General director of military SLAW Belfast and other areas, setting up road blocks and carrying clubs to Paget, commander-in-chief dissuade strike-breakers. Only at a British Army in Ireland and General very late stage was the Army used to Gough, commander the Third move then on a very limited operation. essential supplies, and even Cavalry Brigade General Wilson was a fanatical BBC television in Northern Unionist. He also served on a govern- Ireland was allowed lo operate a office committee which system of "balance" - when Rees atdiscussed how employed in Ulster in the event of the the Army would tacked the strike in a special broad cast, the strikers were given equal rebellion coming to fruition. All time to reply these secret discussions he reported to Labour MP Paul Rose was to later Bonar Law who in turn passed them write that ine government had on to Carson and the Unionists "failure of nerve over the strike. This Paget adopted a more direct ap- was true, but there is no doubt that At a meeting with his senio even if Merlyn Rees had wished to officers in Ireland on 20 March 1914 take on the Loyalists, he would have he attacked *those swine" in found it difficult. government, and while not promising that he would mutiny, encouraged his The clearest evidence on this was officers to do so. an article later written in the magazine of the right-wing Tory Monday Club Mutiny In this an Army officer maintained that the government had decided to General Gough took the try and use troops to smash the strike hint and organised a mutiny at the but leading Army officers had refused Curragh barracks ncar Dublin. to implement the orders Gough, his three colonels and 55 of The 1974 strike was completely his officers declared that they would not move against the Loyalists if in- successful, tried again by the Loyalists in 1977, SO, when the tactic was structed to do so. He was immediate backed up in London by General the Labour government and SUCCIN Roy Mason, to put further pressure on the govern- adopted a different approach. ment. He told Asquith: It was the Both the Army and RUC were certainty of British support more actively deployed in 1977. But had made the strength of Ulster the circumstances were different. One resistance. of the aims of the strike was to bring In the end, this resistance proved hack the old Stormont parliament. successful. Although the first That would have amounted to han war materrupico tae connontanon in ding over all authority in the North of the Liberal or crement had Ireland to lan Paisley.
This Mason couldn't agree to. The capitulated Unionists and strike was defeated or was it? For Tories, and agreed to some form o the second demand of the strikers was partition. had threatened rebellione achieving this, the Loyalists for greater 'sccurity measures. and to this Mason capitulated plied to them from British establish- bought arms, often with money mey sup- in the RUC, to provide them with bet- He agreed to increase the numbers declared their willingness to dely nly circles openly ter wcapons, to increase the strength of the Ulster Defence Regiment and wishes of the British parliament. to increase the activities of the SAS.
In doing the Tories who all this they had had con- been detailed memorandum The proporandom thick mad which spired with the King. the House of been previously presented to Mason Lords and British Army officers to by the Official Unionists. Unionist State in the North of ireland. similarly defy of this the WIsncs Ot paria were enough to persuade the majority The concessions Mason made of Loyalists that strike action was not was born. necessary.
Socialist Challenge 26 November 1981
women win accep-